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NOTES
PEOPLEv. BONNER: AN UNLIKELY
DEFINITION OF CRITICAL STAGE
While recent decisions have contributed much in attempting
to define the extent of the protection afforded by the sixth amendment1 right to the assistance of counsel 2 in criminal proceedings,
it is apparent that its full meaning still remains unclear.3 One
area of difficulty which has given rise to considerable controversy
is that of determining at what point in a criminal prosecution
an accused is entitled to the assistance of counsel 4 and, additionally, the remedy available to a defendant when such right is violated. Thus, while recent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court have made it clear that the right is not limited to the time
of the actual trial, these decisions have avoided specification of
any precise stage of the pretrial proceedings at which the right
1 The

sixth amendment to the Constitution provides that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 For an exhaustive discussion of the right to counsel, see W. BEANEY,
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS (1955). See also Comment,
Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation,
73 YALE L. J. 1000 (1964); King, Right to Counsel in State Courts: An
Analysis of the Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States with
Reference to Indigent Defendants, 8 CRIM. L. Q. 94 (1965). For an interesting treatment of the right to counsel through Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1942) but prior to Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355 (1963), which
accurately predicted Gideon, see Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the
Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue On "The Most Pervasive Right" of an
Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1962). See generally Fellman, The Right
to Counsel Under State Law, 1955 Wis. L. REV. 281; Adam, The Right of an
Accused to Counsel, 54 ILL. B. J. 308 (1965). For a discussion of the right
to counsel, as applied to misdemeanants, see Comment, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 501

(1960).

2The
right to legal representation in criminal proceedings is also guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution. Art. II §9 provides:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and
cause of the accusation and to have a copy thereof, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have process to compel the attendance of witnesses
in his behalf, and a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed.
4The issue being pressed to the extreme, more than one appellate court
has been obliged to observe that "[olne is not entitled to counsel while he
is committing his crime." Garcia v. United States, 364 F.2d 306, 308 (10th
Cir. 1966). See Grier v. United States, 345 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1965). For
a discussion of the stage in criminal proceedings at which an accused is entitled to the assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Constitution see
Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 1269 (1966).
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may be held to vest. 5 In determining whether there is a right to
counsel at a given confrontation between the accused and the
state, the Court looks to the nature and function of the proceeding., Where the Court has determined that the nature and
function of a particular confrontation or stage in the proceeding
requires the constitutional right to counsel, the Court speaks of
such stage as "critical." Thus, "critical stage" becomes the
crucial term of art in this analysis.
In a recent case, People V. Bonner,7 the Illinois Supreme
Court was presented with the question of an accused's right to

counsel at the preliminary hearing.8 In urging that the sixth
amendment right had become vested at this stage in the prosecution, the defendant argued that the preliminary hearing was
first, a critical stage in the proceedings against him, 9 and secondly, that Illinois' statutory provisions entitled him to such
assistance at the preliminary examination. 1° Thus, the Supreme
5 See United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, 333 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964): "[T]here is no arbitrary point in time
at which the right to counsel attaches in pre-trial proceedings." Id. at 611.
6 The court of appeals in Cooper commented:
Even in [White v. -Maryland], decided after [Gideon v. Wainwright],
the Court did not refer to counsel 'at every stage.' Rather, the 'critical'
point is to be determined both from the nature of the proceedings and
from that which actually occurs in each case.
Id. at 611.
737 Ill.2d 553,229 N.E.2d 527 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 910 (1968).
8 The question of whether failure to appoint counsel to represent an
accused at the preliminary hearing unconstitutionally denies the accused of
assistance of counsel within the meaning of Gideon was before the United
States Supreme Court in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1964). The court,
however, disposed of the case on other grounds and therefore did not reach
that issue. Id. at 402.
* 9 In Illinois, the preliminary examination is a statutory proceeding,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §109 (1967).
The purpose of the preliminary examination is to judicially determine
if there is probable cause to hold the accused for trial, to inform him of
the charges against him, fix bail, and perpetuate testimony.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §109, Committee Comments at 135 (Smith-Hurd
1964). It has also been held that the preliminary hearing:
[I]s in no sense a trial in that the guilt or innocence of the accused is
not finally determined, but simply a course of procedure authorized
whereby a possible abuse of power by the prosecution may be prevented
and a discharge of the accused effected or that he be held to answer,, as
the facts warrant.
State v. Langford, 293 Mo. 436, 443 240 S. W. 167, 168 (1922). Although
a preliminary examination is provided for by statute, the Illinois Supreme
Court has held that:
Despite the enactment of the statute there is no constitutional right to
a preliminary hearing prior to indictment or trial .

.

. and we have con-

sistently adhered to the view that where an indictment is returned containing full information of the crime with which an accused is -charged,
a preliminary hearing is not necessary.
People V. Petruso, 35 Ill.2d 578, 580, 221 N.E.2d 276, 277-78 (1966).
10 Counsel in Bonner took a broad approach on appeal urging many
assignments of error, amongst them being: (a) that defendant had a right
to counsel at the preliminary examination; (b) that the United States Supreme Court had extended the right to counsel to every stage of the proceedings; (c) that the preliminary examination was a critical stage in the proceedings; (d) that the indictment returned against defendant did not charge
an offense; (e) that a factual variance existed between the proof and the
purported charge; and, (f) that the sentence of 1-20 years was excessive.
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Court of Illinois was faced with the task of interpreting recent
federal decisions regarding the meaning and definition of "critical stage," as well as the opportunity to re-examine the provisions of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure11 pertaining to
the right to counsel and to the nature of the proceeding known
as the preliminary examination. The court concluded that the
right to the assistance of counsel did not vest at this stage.
THE QUESTION OF CRITICAL STAGE

For years, the leading case involving the right to counsel at
pretrial stages of criminal proceedings was that of Crooker v.
California12 in which the defendant, a man of 31 years and a
college graduate who had attended the first year of law school,
was prosecuted for murder. After his arrest the defendant made

a request for counsel which was denied. During subsequent interrogation he confessed to the crime.

On appeal he urged that

the confession admitted into evidence over his objection had been
coerced from him by state authorities and that even if his confession was voluntary, it occurred while he was without counsel
because of the previous denial of his request therefor. 13 After
his conviction had been affirmed by the Supreme Court of Cali-

fornia, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari

4

"because of the serious due process implications that attend state
denial of a request to employ an attorney."1 5 The question upon

which the grant of certiorari was based was whether "the defendant [was] denied due process of law by the'refusal of the
investigating officers to allow him to consult with an attorney

upon demand being made to do so while he was in custody." '
an often cited passage, the Court stated:

In

The right of an accused to counsel for his defense, though not
firmly fixed in our common-law heritage, is of significant importance to the preservation of liberty in this country ...
That
11 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§100-26 (1967).
12 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
The first of the modern cases involving the
right to counsel is Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), rev'd, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), in which the Court stated:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent
and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of
law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally of determining
for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. Ae is unfamiliar
with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be
put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.
He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand
of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
287 U.S. at 68-69. This holding, however, was directed at the assistance of
counsel at the trial of capital cases.
13 357 U.S. 433, 434 (1958).
14354 U.S. 908 (1957).
15357-U.S. 433, 434 (1958).
16354 U.S. 908 (1957).
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right [is] secured in state prosecutions by the Fourteenth Amendment guaranty of due process .
17

The Court continued:
[S]tate refusal of a request to engage counsel violates due process
not only if the accused is deprived of counsel at trial on the merits
. . . but also if he is deprived of counsel for any part of the
pretrial proceedings, provided that he is so prejudiced thereby as
to infect his subsequent trial with an absence of that fundamental
fairness essential to the very concept of justice. 8

The Court concluded, however, that where, as here, the defendant was fully aware of his rights in the absence of counsel, use
of a voluntary confession made by him after denial of his request
to contact his attorney did not violate due process.' 9
7 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958).
Interpretation of the constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel, as binding in state prosecutions, evolved through
a number of landmark decisions. In Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
(1884), the Supreme Court inferred that in order for a constitutional guarantee to extend to the states it would have to contain an express provision
to that effect. The Court soon began to depart from this rigid position and
held that certain safeguards guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, would be applied to the states via the due process clause in the fourteenth amendment, i.e. that certain concepts of justice specified in the Bill of Rights
were implicit in the definition of due process. See Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) ; Chicago B. &
Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1896).
18357

U.S. 433, 439 (1958).

19 The Supreme Court originally held that the provisions in the Bill of
Rights (including the right to counsel) were limited in their application to
the federal system and were therefore not binding upon the states. See, e.g.,
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution provides, in part, that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
The extent to which the fourteenth amendment incorporates the rights guaranteed in the first ten amendments and makes them binding upon the states,
is a collateral question,, the answer to which is necessary to an understanding of the problems surrounding the right to counsel. It has been asserted
that the fourteenth amendment embraces those "fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions .

. .

."

Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926).

The concept of due process of law as enunciated by the Supreme Court
determines whether a provision of the Bill of Rights is incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment and made binding upon the states. Due process has
been defined in such terms as a "[p]rinciple of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Synder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) ; "[t]hat fundamental fairness
essential to the very concept of justice." Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S.
219, 236 (1941) ; and as a principle "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
The practice of the Supreme Court has been to examine each case before it and determine on an ad hoc basis, whether due process had been
denied. Thus the Court in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), stated that:
Asserted denial [of due process] is to be tested by an appraisal of the
totality of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense
of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short of such denial.
Id. at 462.
In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court declined to
examine the case against the background of its own individual facts and
circumstances, in order to examine whether due process had been denied the
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In a strong dissent, concurred in by Justice Brennan, Justice Black, and Chief Justice Warren, Justice Douglas postulated

that: "The demands of our civilization expressed in the Due
Process clause require that the accused who wants a counsel
should have one at any time after the moment of arrest." 20 The
dissenting opinion held that the fact that the defendant was

college educated and had completed one year of law school was
immaterial, and that denial of the request for counsel in the

instant case violated the requirements of due process.
Three years after Crooker, the Court again considered this
question in Hamilton v. Alabama.21 There, the defendant was
convicted of murder. On appeal it was stipulated that he had

been denied counsel at the arraignment.2 2 Petitioner proceeded
6y way of coram nobis to the Supreme Court of Alabama which
affirmed the conviction on the ground that the defendant failed
to show that the denial of his recognized right to counsel at the
arraignment resulted in any actual prejudice to him.23 The

United States Supreme Court granted certiorari2 4 and expanding on its previous holding in Crooker, reversed the conviction
defendant.

Rather, the Court looked back at Betts v. Brady and, speaking

through the majority voice of Mr. Justice Black, stated that:
We accept Betts v. Brady's assumption, based as it was on our prior
cases, that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is 'fundamental and

essential to a fair trial' is made obligatory upon the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment. We think the Court in Betts was wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel
is not one of these fundamental rights.
Id. at 342. Gideon therefore stands for the proposition that the right to
counsel was incorporated by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, in 1963, the law had evolved from the position that a person
charged with a felony was denied the aid of counsel to the position that the
right to counsel was fundamental and essential to fair trial, affirming the
proposition that:
The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the
constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not 'still be
done.' It embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the
average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect'
himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or
liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned
counsel.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).
20 Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 448 (1958).
21 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
22 In Illinois, the arraignment is also a statutory proceeding, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, §113 (1967).
The arraignment is nothing more than to call the prisoner to the
bar of the court to answer the charge against him. The generally accepted purpose of the arraignment is threefold. It fixes the identity
of the accused, informs him of the charge against him in a formal manner, and gives him an opportunity to be heard.
It is well established in most states that the arraignment is the beginning of the 'trial.'
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,. §113-1, Committee Comments at 278 (Smith-Hurd
1964). Cf. People v. Terry, 366 Ill. 520, 9 N.E.2d 322 (1937).
23EX parte Hamilton, 271 Ala. 88, 93, 122 So.2d 602, 607 (1960). For
the procedural history of this case see In re Hamilton, 273 Ala. 504, 142
So.2d 868 (1962).
24364 U.S. 931 (1961).
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for the reason that no showing of actual prejudice is required:
"When one pleads to a capital charge without benefit of coun-

sel, we do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted.
'25
. . [because], the degree of prejudice can never be known.
*

Thus, while Crooker had required that actual prejudice be
shown to have resulted from a denial of the right to counsel at

pretrial stages of criminal proceedings, Hamilton acknowledged
that such prejudice would be presumed under certain facts and
circumstances. More significantly, in Hamilton the Court began
to lay the foundation for the development of the concept of the
"critical stage" test. The Court observed that: "Arraignment
under Alabama law is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding.
26
happens there may affect the whole trial.
In the subsequent case of White v. Maryland, 7 the Supreme

...What

Court affirmed its holding in Hamilton. After being arrested,
the defendant, without benefit of counsel, was brought before
the court for a preliminary hearing and there pleaded guilty to

a charge of murder.

Subsequently, at his arraignment, the

defendant was provided with counsel and thereupon withdrew his
plea of guilty and entered a plea of not guilty. At trial, the defendant's plea of guilty, made at the preliminary hearing, was
admitted into evidence without objection. Ultimately, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to death. On review,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the conviction. 2 Dealing with the defendant's contention that he was denied the right
to counsel at the preliminary hearing, the court observed:
"[T]here was no requirement . . . to appoint counsel for the
U.S. 52, 55 (1961).
26 Id. at .53-54. The Court noted that at the Alabama arraignment the
defense of insanity must be pleaded or the opportunity is lost. Pleas in
abatement must also be made at the time of arraignment. Thereafter such
plea ma1 not be made except in the discretion of the trial judge, and his
refusal to accept it is not reviewable on appeal. Id. at 53. The Alabama
Supreme Court held that in the absence of an allegation that the defendant
had such a plea in abatement or defense of insanity, the failure of the court
to appoint counsel at the arraignment, while constituting error, did not constitute reversible error. Ex parte Hamilton, 271 Ala. 88, 122 So.2d 602
(1960). The United States Supreme Court refused to consider whether or
not the defendant had such a plea in abatement or defense of insanity, It
is implicit in the holding that the Court is going to presume that failure to
appoint counsel at a stage where rights or defenses must be therein asserted
or be irretrievably lost is of significant prejudice to the accused. Such a
stage is labeled a critical stage. When a defendant is denied the right to
counsel at such a stage, the Court presumes prejudice without reaching or
considering the actual merits of the case.
It is of interest that the Court reached this conclusion without apparent
consideration of at least one other reason which has been given for holding
that the assistance of counsel is needed at the arraignment: Plea bargaining, i.e. arranging for the defendant to plead guilty to a lesser charge. See
Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain Justice,
46 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 780 (1956).
27 373 U.S. 59 (1963), per curiam.
2SWhite v. State, 227 Md. 615, 177 A.2d 877 (1962), rev'd, 373 U.S. 59
(1963).
25 368
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appellant at the preliminary hearing before the magistrate ...

nor was it necessary for appellant to enter a plea at that time."2 9
In answering the appellant's contention that it was error to
admit into evidence the former plea of guilty, the court held that;
[N]o objection to the testimony as to the plea appears in the record
and therefore the question is not properly before us, since it was
not raised below and decided by the trial court. . . . However,
further discussion, that the contention is
we point out, 2 without
0
without merit.
The United States Supreme Court granted limited certiorari,2 1 restricted to the point of law raised in Hamilton. On

review, the Court stated that denial of the right to counsel
violates the requirements of due process without regard to ensuing prejudice, wherever the pretrial proceeding, regardless of
the name by which it is called, constitutes a critical stage in the

proceeding.

In a footnote to the decision, the Court observed:

"Although petitioner did not object to the introduction of [his
v. Alabama
former plea of guilty] ... the rationale of Hamilton
' 2
.does not rest ... on a showing of prejudice. 1
"9Id.at 625, 177 A.2d at 882.
20 Id. at 619-20, 177 A.2d at 879.
31371 U.S. 909 (1962).
White v. Maryland was a per curiam
32 373 U.S. 59, 60 n. (1963).
opinion which raised several questions which have yet to be answered. In
White, the state obtained from the defendant a plea of guilty at the preliminary examination at a time when he was without counsel. Under the
procedural rules of Maryland, the defendant was not required to enter a
plea until arraignment. The Court seems to have reasoned that inasmuch as
the defendant was to enter his plea at the arraignment, and since he entered his plea at the preliminary hearing, therefore, the preliminary hearing
was "de facto" an arraignment. The Court, having earlier decided, in
Hamilton v. Alabama, that the arraignment is a critical stage wherein the
defendant is entitled to an requires the assistance of counsel, concluded that
the preliminary examination in Maryland wherein a defendant is allowed
to enter a plea is the equivalent of arraignment in other jurisdictions and
therefore a critical stage which requires the assistance of counsel.
While the Maryland Supreme Court indicated that the fact that defendant was not required to enter a plea was controlling, see text at note
29 supra, the United States Supreme Court indicated that the fact that defendant could enter a plea at the preliminary hearing was decisive. This
was expressly stated in the subsequent case of Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965).
In this Court we do not find it necessary to decide one aspect of
the question petitioner raises, that is, whether failure to appoint counsel to represent him at the preliminary hearing unconstitutionally denied him the assistance of counsel within the meaning of Gideon v.
. In making that argument petitioner relies mainly on
Wainwright ...
White v. Maryland . . . in which this Court reversed a conviction based

in part upon evidence that the defendant had pleaded guilty to the
crime at a preliminary hearing where he was without counsel. Since the
preliminary hearing there, as in Hamilton v. Alabama . . . was one in

which pleas to the charge could be made, we held in White as in Hamilton that a preliminary proceeding of that nature was so critical a stage
in the prosecution that a defendant at that point was entitled to counsel. But the State informs us that at a Texas preliminary hearing,
such as is involved here, pleas of guilty or not guilty are not accepted
and that the judge decides only whether the accused should be bound
over to the grand jury and if so whether he should be admitted to bail.
Because of these significant differences in the procedures of the respective States, we cannot say that the White case is necessarily controlling
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Finally, in Escobedo v. Illinois,3 3 the Court again examined
its definition of critical stage and, in referring to the right to
counsel at the in custodial interrogation stage of criminal proceedings, observed that:
It was a stage surely as critical as was the arraignment in Hamilton V. Alabama . . .and the preliminary hearing in White V.
Maryland. . . What happened at this interrogation could certainly 'affect the whole trial.' . . .34
Having examined the concept of a critical stage on three
occasions, the Supreme Court has set forth the test for determining that stage which constitutes a critical stage, that is:
35
What happens there may or could affect the subsequent trial.

The sixth amendment guarantee of the right to counsel

"encompasses counsel's assistance whenever necessary to assure a meaningful 'defence.' -3" It would appear that the courts
are gradually coming to recognize that where the need for counsel exists, there should be a right to counsel. In its analysis
of the right to counsel, the Court has developed the concept of
Although never explicitly defined by the
the critical stage.
Court, an analysis of the aforementioned cases seems to reveal
two elements which must be present before the Court will determine that a confrontation between the accused and the state
constitutes a critical stage in the proceedings: (1) events must
transpire therein which may affect the subsequent trial, and
(2) the assistance of counsel must be necessary to assure that
these events affect the subsequent trial only to the measure peras to the right to counsel. Whether there might be other circumstances
making this Texas preliminary hearing so critical to the defendant as
to call for appointment of counsel at that stage we need not decide on
this record, and that question we reserve.
Id. at 402-03.
In White, the taking of a plea from the defendant and its subsequent
introduction into evidence in the ensuing trial was actual prejudice. The
Court chose not to address itself to this point, but observed that denial of
the right to counsel violated the requirements of due process without regard
to ensuing prejudice, whenever the pretrial proceeding, regardless of the
name by which it is called, constitutes a critical stage in the proceeding.
Thus it appears that the Court chose to rely on its finding that the Maryland
preliminary examination constituted an arraignment and refused to consider
the question of the right to counsel at what is generally understood to be a
preliminary hearing.
Of greater import, however, is the holding of the Court that an objection to the introduction of the plea of guilty was not necessary. Seemingly
this would shift the duty of excluding such reversible error from counsel
for the defense to the prosecution and the court.
33378 U.S. 478 (1964).
34Id. at 486.
35Presuming that a court utilizes the greatest care in formulating its
decisive utterances, the Court did not say that what happened there must
affect or was likely to affect the subsequent trial. Rather, the Court phrased
its utterance in prospective or subjunctive terms. In so doing, it shifted
the focus from the alleged prejudice to the inherent nature of the proceedings
itself.
36 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 225 (1967). See Note, United
States v. Wade: A Case of Mistaken Identity, 1 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC.

285 (1968).
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mitted by law. The decisions of the Court in this area lend
themselves to an interpretation that two different and distinct
functions of counsel exist.37
Initially, the function of counsel is to guide the accused as
to the existence and exercise of his legal prerogative and thereby
prevent the occurrence of events which the state has no right to
have occur. In White, this function of counsel was manifest in
that the state obtained from the defendant a plea of guilty at
the preliminary examination,3 where the defendant was not
required to make any plea at that time. To give the right
meaning and substance, any evidence or testimony obtained from
the accused during the period of denial of counsel is, under the
exclusionary rule,3 9 rendered inadmissible. 40 It was, therefore,
held that the plea of guilty, made at a time when the defendant
was without counsel, could not be introduced into evidence at
the subsequent trial. In Hamilton, the Court seemed to recognize the function of counsel as protecting against the occurrence
of prejudicial events. 41 There, the defendant appeared at arraignment without counsel. At the arraignment, certain defenses had to be raised or rights asserted therein, or they would
be irretrievably lost. The Court, refusing to consider whether,
in fact, the defendant had such rights or defenses as could have
been asserted, held that where a defendant fails to assert a right
during a time when he was without counsel, such failure to assert
the right was deemed due to the absence of counsel (as opposed
to the nonexistence of such a right or defense) and the nonexercise of such right was prejudicial. The remedy in Hamilton
37
1n United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), holding that an accused is entitled to representation at the lineup, the Court seems to find
a new function of counsel: that of witness for the defense. Inasmuch as
counsel can in no way prevent an unreasonable lineup from taking place,
the primary value to the accused of the requirement of counsel's presence
appearsoto be his ability to testify as an eye witness at a motion to suppress
the identification.
38 The Court, however, held that a
reliminary hearing at which an accused is allowed to enter a plea is "de act o" the equivalent of arraignment
and that all rights which attach at the arraignment stage of the prosecution
therefore attach at a preliminary hearing at which the defendant is allowed
to enter his plea. See authority cited at note 32 supra.
3
9 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
40Crooker is thus distinguishable from White, Hamilton and Escobedo,
in that the Court found as a finding of fact that the defendant was aware of
the existence and method of exercise of his basic rights; therefore the assistance of counsel was found not to be necessary. See text following note

18 supra.

41 The scope of Hamilton is, however, much broader than this. Hamilton, besides impliedly recognizing one function of counsel to be that of preventing the occurrence of an event which the state had no right to have
occur, i.e. the lapse of the defendant's right to raise certain pleas in abatement and the defense of insanity, seems to recognize another function of
counsel: that of making certain favorable events occur. This appears to
explain the Court's holding that no attempt would be made to determine
whether the defendant actually had such a defense or plea in abatement and
that instead, prejudice would be presumed. See authority cited at note 26
supra.
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was to expunge the record of the arraignment in which the
defenses lapsed and in which the defendant was without counsel.
Inasmuch as the arraignment is an essential step in a valid trial, 42
it followed automatically that the judgment was reversed. Once
again, in Escobedo, the function of counsel as one who prevents
the occurrence of prejudicial events is apparent. There, the
defendant, abandoning his fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, made incriminating statements against himself to the officials who had him in custody. The Court, holding
that an intelligent waiver of a defendant's fifth amendment
privilege cannot take place until the defendant is afforded an
opportunity to consult with counsel, 43 found that this evidence
was obtained from the accused at a time when he was without
the assistance of counsel and that, as in White, such evidence
was inadmissible at the subsequent trial.
The second function of counsel, as illustrated by Gideon v.
Wainwrigh 44 and its progeny, is to bring about the occurrence
of events favorable to the defense; that is, to raise affirmative
matters beneficial to the defense by examination of witnesses
and introduction of evidence and to argue the client's cause to
judge and jury. In analyzing this second function of counsel,
it is observed that a less apparent prejudice results from the
failure to afford counsel at a point where his assistance might
have produced matter favorable to the defense. This is the field
of "might have beens." Where an unfavorable event occurs
which need not have taken place had the defendant had the
assistance of counsel, the Court may point to that event and observe: But for the denial of counsel, this specific prejudice would
have been eliminated. 4 5 Where events fail to occur due to the
failure of the state to afford the right to counsel, the Court cannot
speculate as to what might have been. Here the Court must say,
as in Hamilton,4 6 "we do not stop to determine whether prejudice
resulted . . . . [because] the degree of prejudice can never be
known. ' ' 41 Where an accused is denied the right to cross-examine witnesses, 4 the degree of prejudice can never be known
and the Court declines to speculate as to whether cross-examination might have uncovered favorable matter. Expanding upon
the second function of counsel, it is insufficient that the defen42

See authority cited at note 22 supra.

43 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n. 14 (1963).
44 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
See authority cited at note 19 supra.
45 This is not necessarily true.
However, where the defendant is en-

titled to the assistance of counsel and that right is denied, a court would
appear "more than justified" in presuming that counsel, had he been available, would have taken every conceivable step in the defense of the accused.
46 See authority cited at note 41 supra.
47,368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961).
48 See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Alford v. United
States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
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dant merely be represented at trial or at those stages where evidence is obtained from him which might be used at trial. If
counsel is to be effective in bringing about the occurrence of
events favorable to the defense, it follows that he must have a
realistic opportunity to investigate and prepare the case. It has
been held that counsel must be made available well enough in
advance of trial to enable him to investigate and prepare the
defense. In Powell v. Alabama,4 9 the Court observed:
[D]uring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings
against these defendants . ..when consultation, thorough going
investigation and preparation were vitally important, the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although
they were as much entitled to such aid during that period as at
the trial itself."
In DeToro v. Pepersack,'1 the defendant had been tried and

convicted of homicide in Maryland. Having exhausted his state
remedies, 52- DeToro applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the
federal courts, urging that the denial of the right to counsel at
the preliminary hearing, wherein defendant had pleaded not
guilty, vitiated his conviction. Relying heavily upon Powell, the
petitioner urged that he had a right to counsel at every step in
the proceedings.13 Rejecting this contention, the court found
that:
[T]he thrust of Powell's admonition that an accused has a right
to counsel 'at every step in the proceedings against him,' as borne
out by subsequent decisions, including Hamilton and White, seems
to be that if the effectiveness of legal assistance ultimately furnished an accused is likely to be prejudicial by its prior denial,
the earlier period may be deemed a critical stage in the judicial
process and a conviction obtained in such circumstances is rendered
54
invalid.
One court,55 at least, agreed with the proposition urged in
DeToro and held that counsel must be assigned at the preliminary
hearing when he might be helpful in investigating and preparing
the case. That decision was subsequently vacated, in Harris v.
Wilson,56 a habeas corpus proceeding, where the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, Southern
Division, having examined the cases of Powell, Hamilton and
White, observed that: "[Alny stage where the advice of counsel
49 287 U.S. 45 (1932).

50 Id. at 57.

Powell, however, was not concerned with the preliminary

hearing. The period referred to by the Court was that between arraignment and trial.
51332 F.2d 341 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964).
52 DeToro v. State, 227 Md. 551, 177 A.2d 847 (1962); DeToro v.
Warden, 231 Md. 635, 190 A.2d 783 (1963).
53 See authority cited at note 12 supra.
54 DeToro v. Pepersack, 332 F.2d 341, 343-44 (4th Cir. 1964).
55 Harris v. Wilson, 239 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Cal.), vacated, 351 F.2d 840
(9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 951 (1966).
56 Id.

Unlikely Definition of Critical Stage
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would 'affect the whole trial', is a 'critical point' at which, absent
valid waiver, counsel must be appointed if the defendant is unable to obtain his own. '57 After making some general observations
regarding the nature of the preliminary examination in California, the court declared:
Perhaps the most convincing reason that presence of defense
counsel at Preliminary Examination might 'affect the whole trial'
is the fact that the Examination is an initial adversary confrontation. The rest of the judicial proceedings can be completely avoided
if the defendant achieves a victory at this stage . . . . Furthermore, prosecution witnesses may be cross-examined and the defense may proffer its own witnesses. In all of these matters, the
absence of defense counsel could have a crucial effect on the actermination of the criminal
cused's opportunity to obtain a complete
5
proceedings at this early stage.
The court continued:
The fact that the Preliminary Examination is a species of
criminal pre-trial discovery is another reason for requiring appointment of counsel at this point. On cross-examination, counsel
could elicit information helpful for the defense. What is discovered at this point could affect the defense strategy for the rest
of the criminal proceedings.5 9
One major objective sought to be achieved in the American
system of jurisprudence is the guarantee to all defendants of a
fair trial.60 The United States Supreme Court has determined
that certain provisions of the Bill of Rights are fundamental
and essential to a fair trial and must be afforded a state criminal
defendant if the guarantee is to have meaning and substance.'
One such right is the sixth amendment right to counsel. Thus,
the Court has recognized that:
[T]he average defendant does not have the professional legal skill
to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to
take his life or liberty, wherein62the prosecution is presented by
experienced and learned counsel.
Therefore: "The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost,
justice will not 'still be done.' ,,13
The Court has also recognized that there not only exists a
duty to provide counsel at trial but also a duty to provide counsel
well enough in advance of trial so that he may properly investigate and prepare his case for "[n]either ... [counsel] nor court
7 Id. at 209.
58 Id. at 210.
59 Id.

60 An examination of the federal cases leads to the conclusion that it is
the duty of the Court to see that the accused is "denied no necessary incident
of a fair trial." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 52 (1932).

61 As to incorporation of various provisions of the Bill of Rights within
the fourteenth amendment definition of due process, see authority cited at
note 19 supra.
62 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).
63

Id. at 462.

310

The John MarshallJournal of Practiceand Procedure

[Vol. 2:298

-.. [can] say what a prompt and thorough-going investigation
might disclose as to the facts. 6 1 4 Inasmuch as the state's legal
machinery is put into motion at the time of the accused's arrest

and since a collateral arm of the state is fully investigating the
facts and circumstances of the case for the state, 5 might not
a court rationally conclude, as in Harris,that fundamental fairness requires that the accused should have the right to put his
own legal machinery into motion contemporaneously ?66
The Illinois View
The Illinois Supreme Court has recognized that the right to

counsel is not confined to representation during the actual trial
but may extend to pretrial proceedings.6 7
v. Morris,6 the court noted:

In the case of People

64 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932).
The major question left
unanswered, except for the attempt made by the court in Harris v. Wilson,
note 51 supra, is the method of combatting the prejudice to the investigation
resulting from delay in the appointment of counsel. What if the accused has
an alibi witness who disappears in the interval between the time that the
accused is arrested and counsel is appointed? Would a court speculate that
counsel might or might not have been able to restrain his disappearance, take
his deposition for the purpose of perpetuating testimony, or even arrange to
have him held as a material witness or might a court decree that the degree
of prejudice could never be known? Might the defendant first be required
to establish that such a witness existed or would a mere allegation suffice?
Just why the Supreme Court has not chosen to find that fundamental
fairness requires the appointment of counsel from the time of arrest is not
clear. On its face, any delay in appointment of counsel is diametrically
opposed to prompt and thorough going investigation. By the same reasoning
any delay equally prejudices the thoroughness of the investigation. It
would seem that a meaningful "prompt and thorough investigation" implies
an immediate investigation which requires appointment of counsel at the
time of arrest.
65 Whether the official investigation is made on behalf of the prosecution or whether made in the interests of justice, with the state objectively
attempting to collect information which may either implicate or exonerate
the accused, is a substantial question beyond the scope of this note.
Whether our system is adversarial or whether it is accusatorial and what
ramifications flow from each concept is a closely related question also beyond the scope of this note. However, for two recent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court wherein the system has been labeled adversarial, see
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. (1966), and Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S.
66 (1967), (dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan joined by Justices Black,
Clark and Stewart).
66 This point was made in the minority opinion of People v. Bonner
where it was stated that: "The State was represented by an attorney, but
the defendant's request for a continuance to retain an attorney was overridden." 37 Ill.2d 553, 567, 229 N.E.2d 527, 535 (1967). It is somewhat
curious that the United States Supreme Court would, as in Hamilton, refuse
to consider whether the defendant actually had a defense of insanity or
plea in abatement which could have been raised at the arraignment and
presume prejudice but would not consider that a delay in the appointment
of counsel per se prejudices his ability to investigate the case. Perhaps the
answer lies in the suggestion made by the Court in Pointer v. Texas:
Whether there might be other circumstances making this Texas preliminary hearing so critical to the defendant as to call for appointment
of counsel at that stage we need not decide on this record, and that
question we reserve.
380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). Since that time, the question has not come before the Court.
67 People v. Morris, 30 Ill.2d 406, 410, 197 N.E.2d 433, 435 (1964).
68 30 Ill.2d 406, 197 N.E.2d 433 (1964).
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[D]ue process is violated by the lack of counsel before trial whenever the pretrial circumstances are such that the accused is so
prejudiced thereby as to infect his subsequent trial with an absence
of fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. 69
However, in considering the right of an accused to representation at the preliminary hearing stage of the proceedings, the
Morris court found that in Illinois:
[T]he scope and purpose of preliminary proceedings are in general
to ascertain whether a crime charged has been committed and, if
so, whether there is probable cause to believe that it was committed by the accused. 70
The court,-focusing particularly upon the nature and function of
the preliminary hearing, examined the criminal procedure followed in Illinois and found no danger of prejudice inherent in
the preliminary hearing which would warrant a presumption of
prejudice or require the assistance of counsel.7 1 The court therefore held that: "A preliminary hearing in Illinois is not a critical stage where rights or defenses must be raised or lost and
' 72
neither is it a proceeding at which pleas are made or received.
It was the conclusion of the Morris court, therefore that, absent a
showing of prejudice, in Illinois an accused does not have the
right to counsel at the preliminary hearing stage of the proceedings.
Not until the recent case of People v. Bonner did the Illinois
Supreme Court clearly express its test for determining whether
69 Id. at 411, 197 N.E.2d at 435. This is substantially the same proposition of law as stated in Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958).
See text at note 18 supra. The expression "so prejudiced" implies that a
certain degree of prejudice exists, i.e. that so much prejudice exists "as to
infect the subsequent trial with an absence of fundamental fairness essential
to the very concept of justice." 357 U.S. at 439. The White and Hamilton
opinions, which were cited by the court in Morris, stand for the proposition
that where counsel is denied at a critical stage, a court will not consider
or speculate upon the degree of prejudice and will presume, from the fact
that counsel was denied at such a stage, that such prejudice resulted therefrom, as to infect the subsequent trial.
70 30 Ill.2d 406, 411, 197 N.E.2d 433, 436 (1964).
71 Id. at 412, 197 N.E.2d at 436.
"There is neither claim nor showing
that the absence of counsel at the preliminary hearing prejudiced the defendants in any manner or fatally infected their subsequent trial .... "
72 Id. at 411, 197 N.E.2d at 436.
In making this statement the court
relied heavily upon the analysis of the United States Supreme Court in
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), in which the Supreme Court began to develop the concepts of critical stage and presumption of prejudice.
In Hamilton, the Court found that there was actual prejudice in that certain
defenses available to the defendant would have been "irretrievably lost, if
not then and there asserted. . . . " 368 U.S. at 54. The Court, however,
went further and established the critical stage test as being a stage where
events might transpire which could affect the subsequent trial. See text at
note 26 supra. The Morris court perhaps took too narrow a view of the Hamilton case, in that it looked only to the statement referring to actual prejudice,
i.e. that certain defenses available would have been lost if not then and there
asserted, and totally ignored the statement referring to presumed prejudice,
i.e. a stage where events might transpire which could affect the subsequent
trial. The analysis of the Morris court therefore seems to miss the prospective and subjunctive test established by Hamilton and relies upon the showing of actual prejudice in that case as the decisive" factor.
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a given proceeding is a critical stage. In Bonner, the defendant
was accused of attempted rape.7 3

Three days after his arrest

he was taken before a judge for a preliminary examination, at
which time he requested a continuance for the express purpose
of engaging private counsel.

The court disregarded the request

and proceeded with the examination to determine whether there
was probable cause to submit the case to the grand jury. Prosecution witnesses were examined and the court bound the defendant over to the grand jury.74 A pretrial motion to dismiss
the indictment, based on the earlier denial of the asserted right
to counsel at the preliminary examination, was also denied, and
after his subsequent conviction, Bonner urged this denial as an

assignment of error.
Bonner's first contention on appeal was that all stages in
a criminal prosecution are critical stages. Relying upon the admonition of the United States Supreme Court in Powell V. Alabama,75 that a defendant "requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him,"6 Bonner urged that
78
7
the recent cases of Escobedo v. Illinois- and Mirandav. Arizona
had extended the right to counsel to every step in the proceedings.
73 The complaining witness was attacked on a Chicago street at 3:00
A.M. The assailant pulled her to the ground and removed her undergarments.
The victim, screaming and struggling, bit her assailant's hand. An eyewitness observed the attack and summoned the police. The witness and police
interrupted the attack in progress and when the assailant fled, they pursued
and apprehended the defendant after a short chase. The defendant lived a
great distance from the scene of the attack and had no explanation for being
at the scene of the crime; his finger was bleeding from a bite which he
claimed was inflicted by a dog. The defendant contended that he was running from the scene because he 'heard a shot (fired by the police at the
assailant) and was afraid.
74 37 Ill.2d 553, 556, 229 N.E.2d 527, 529 (1967).
75287 U.S. 45 (1932).
76 Id. at 69.
This admonition, however, has never been held to grant
to a defendant the right to counsel at every step in the proceedings. See
text at notes 51-54 supra. The proposition, however, is not without judicial
recognition. See, e.g., In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957) (dissenting opinion
of Justice Black): "This Court has repeatedly held that an accused in a
state criminal prosecution has an unqualified right to make use of counsel
at every stage of the proceedings against him." Id. at 344.
77 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
78 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Here the Court began with the proposition that:
"The denial of the defendant's request for his attorney . . . undermined his
ability to exercise the privilege . . . to remain silent if he chose or to speak

without any intimidation ... .

."

Id. at 466.

To combat the pressures of

incustodial police interrogation and to provide a full opportunity for the
exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court developed
specific warnings that would adequately and effectively apprise the accused
of his rights. In so doing, the Court shifted from a position that a request
for counsel was necessary to invoke the right, to a position that the protection of the right exists until intelligently waived. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) for the early position of the Court on the conditions precedent to an intelligent waiver of constitutional rights.
Following the holding in Miranda, the Illinois Supreme Court conceded in Bonner that: "[A]n accused's right to representation should not
be made to depend up
is request for it." 37 Ill.2d 553, 561, 229 N.E.2d
527, 532 (1967).

1969]
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As previously indicated, in the discussion of Harris v. Wilson,7 9
a logical extension of the federal critical stage test would appear
to be that all pretrial stages are critical, inasmuch as events
transpire therein which might or could prejudice a subsequent
trial from the moment that the investigation begins to focus on

the accused.
As an alternative proposition to his initial contention that
all stages are critical, it was suggested in Bonner that the preliminary examination in Illinois was by definition a critical stage
at which important rights could be lost and at which events
transpired which might or could affect the subsequent trial. In
support of this proposition, the appellant noted that at the preliminary examination the defendant: (a) for the first time
learned the state's case against him; (b) had the opportunity to
cross-examine witnesses before their testimony became hardened
and fixed; and (c) could enter a plea of guilty to a lesser charge.80
Additionally it was argued that Illinois statutory provisions
entitled the defendant to the assistance of counsel at the preliminary examination81
79 239 F.Supp. 204 (N.D. Cal.), vacated, 351 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 951 (1966). See text at notes 55-59 supra.
80 37 Ill.2d at 559, 229 N.E.2d at 531. Other than denial of the right
to cross-examine by skilled counsel, defendant could not show any act of
actual prejudice and was therefore forced to urge the court to consider the
proposition of Hamilton, that the court should not stop to determine whether
prejudice resulted because the degree of prejudice could never be known. It
will be recalled that where the right to counsel is denied at a critical stage in
the proceedings, prejudice is presumed to have occurred, while actual prejudice must be shown where the right is denied at a non-critical stage in the
prosecution. The gravamen of the problem facing Bonner was that since
he was unable to show actual prejudice resulting from the denial of counsel
at the preliminary examination (other than the right to cross-examine
witnesses called by the state), he was obliged to convince the court that
the preliminary examination was a critical stage where prejudice should be
presumed.
In developing the concept of presumed prejudice, the United States
Supreme Court began with a determination that the right to counsel extended
to certain pretrial proceedings, holding that:
[S]tate refusal of a request to engage counsel violates due process not
only if the accused is deprived of counsel at trial on the merits, . . .
but also if he is deprived of counsel for any part of the pretrial proceedings, provided that he is so prejudiced thereby as to infect his
subsequent trial with an absence of that fundamental fairness essential
to the very concept of justice.
It will be noted that this
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958).
holding of the Court, while recognizing the right to counsel in pretrial proceedings, also recognized limitations of the right in that (a) it applied only
to certain cases and (b) it implied that a request for counsel was necessary
to invoke the right. In this context it must be remembered that the Crooker
case was decided five years prior to the case of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963).
Moving forward from its position in Crooker, that actual prejudice must
be shown, the Court held in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) that:
"When one pleads to a capital charge without benefit of counsel, . . . the
degree of prejudice can never be known." Id. at 55. Thus, the Supreme
Court held that there were facts and circumstances in which prejudice need
not be shown but would be conclusively presumed.
81 37 Ill.2d at 560, 229 N.E.2d at 531-32. It might also be argued that
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In stating the Illinois test for critical stage, the Illinois
Supreme Court in Bonner ignored what appears to be the trend
of Hamilton, White and Escobedo and looked instead to the decision of the Federal Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
in DeToro v. Pepersack,1 a case which antedated Escobedo, and
held that:
[A] stage in the proceedings against an accused is properly designated as 'critical,' irrespective of how it is labeled, when events
transpire there which are likely to prejudice his subsequent
trial.83
The Illinois test would appear to depart from the test enunciated
in Hamilton, White and Eseobedo. The federal test for determining whether a given confrontation is a critical stage is
whether events transpire therein which might or could affect the
subsequent trial. Thus, the federal test directs that the possibility of prejudice determines whether a stage is critical. The
Illinois test, by applying a standard of whether events transpire
which are likely to affect the subsequent trial directs that probability of prejudice determines whether a stage is critical. 4 The
Illinois test is an intermediate position, between the requirement
that actual prejudice be shown and the current federal definition
of critical stage. Apparently, for a stage in an Illinois proceeding to be deemed critical, it must be shown that prejudice would
more likely than not result from a denial of counsel.
any stage temporarily following a critical stage is itself a critical stage.
However, since the proper definition of critical stage is one in which events
transpire which may or could affect the subsequent trial, to say that any
stage, regardless of whether events transpire there which may or could
affect the subsequent trial, is critical because it follows a stage where events
transpire which may or could affect the subsequent trial is to ignore the
basic criterion of prejudice altogether.
82 332 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1964). See text at notes 51-54 supra.
8337 Ill.2d 553, 558, 229 N.E.2d 527, 531 (1967).
84 While the Court had stated in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52
(1961) that "we do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted ....
[because], the degree of prejudice can never be known." Id. at 55, the
court of appeals in DeToro v. Pepersack, 332 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1964), took
the position that it would have to be shown that prejudice would more likely
than not result from the denial of counsel. Thus, the court stated that:
[A]n accused is denied rights afforded him under the sixth amendment
when he is subjected to an arraignment or to a preliminary hearing
without the assistance of counsel, where events transpire that are
likely to prejudice his ensuing trial.
Id. at 343.
DeToro was decided two months prior to Escobedo v. Illinois. The
Court in Hamilton had said: "What happens there may affect the whole
trial." 368 U.S. at 54. The Court in Escobedo stated: "What happened at
this interrogation could certainly affect the whole trial." 378 U.S. at 486.
Prior to these holdings, the Court insisted on a showing of actual prejudice. The Court, therefore, was expressing that prejudice must be shown.
In moving from the term "must" to the term "may" it is suggested that
the Court still required a showing of probability of prejudice and that the
DeToro statement of the law was sound. However, when the Court adopted
the term "could" into the definition, it would seem that it was then only
necessary for the defendant to show a possibility of prejudice resulting from
the denial of counsel and that the more stringent requirements had been
abandoned.

1969]
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Having defined a critical stage as one in which there exists a
probability of prejudice, the court applied this standard to the
contentions raised by Bonner. First considering whether the
right to counsel had been extended by the United States Supreme
Court by Escobedo and Mirandato every step in the proceedings,
the court, without elaboration, held that:
[I]t [did] not read [Escobedo and Miranda] . . . as constituting
a departure from the 'critical stage' test enunciated in [the] ...
earlier decisions of [White and Hamilton] . . . or as announcing
to counsel to every step in the proceedings
an extension of the 8right
5
against an accused.

85 37 1ll.2d 553, 558-59, 229 N.E.2d 527, 531 (1967). The court emphasized, in justification of its position, that Escobedo was limited to an incustody interrogation situation and stood only for the proposition that this
situation was deemed to be a critical stage.
What must be borne in mind is that Escobedo and Miranda were primarily concerned with the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In this context, the Court held that the accused must be made aware
of his sixth amendment guaranty of the right to counsel before an intelligent waiver of his fifth amendment right could be effective. It was expressly held in Miranda that the authorities could refrain from providing
counsel to the accused without violating his fifth amendment privilege, so
long as they did not question him during that time. 384 U.S. at 474. It was
not before the Court and the Court did not intimate whether a denial of request for counsel at that time would be violative of the sixth amendment
right.
A further example of how the Illinois Supreme Court ministerprets
Escobedo and Miranda, by failing to recognize that the sixth amendment
right to counsel must be afforded an accused before he can intelligently
waive or exercise his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
is found in People v. Murdock, 39 Ill.2d 553, 237 N.E.2d 442 (1968). In
Murdock, the accused was charged with burglary, rape and murder. A
coroner's inquest was held at which the accused was called to testify. The
coroner, who presided at the hearing, admonished the accused that anything he might testify to could be used against him at a future trial. The
accused was also advised of his right to remain silent but was not advised
of his right to counsel. No offer to provide counsel to the accused, if indigent, was made. The accused waived his privilege against self-incrimination and made damaging statements against his interests which were subsequently introduced at his subsequent trial over objection.
The court took cognizance of a statute, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 31, §18.1
(1967), which provided that any witness appearing at the inquest shall
have the right to be represented by counsel. The court held, however, that
the aforementioned statute: "[H]as never been construed to give an indigent witness the right to free counsel, even though such witness was then
suspected of murdering the decedent." 39 Ill.2d at 557, 237 N.E.2d at 445.
The Murdock court noted that "appointment of counsel for an indigent
is required at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights
of a criminal accused may be affected," 39 Ill.2d at 558, 237 N.E.2d at 445,
citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967). However, the court concluded that a coroner's inquest is not such a stage of a criminal proceeding
and therefore the accused did not have the right to appointed counsel. Thus,
the coroner's inquest is not a critical stage. It was observed by the court
that the Illinois rule is that any failure to advise the defendant of his constitutional rights and failure to provide him with counsel are only attendant
circumstances in deciding whether a confession is voluntary, citing People
v. Musil, 37 Ill.2d 373, 227 N.E.2d 751 (1967). However, this rule appears
to be in conflict with the holding of the United States Supreme Court in
Memlia v. Rhay, supra. The Illinois court resolved this conflict, by observing that Mempa applied to sentencing, a critical stage, while Musil involved
a coroner's inquest, a non-critical stage.
That an accused cannot intelligently waive or exercise his privilege
against self incrimination without being first afforded, an opportunity to
avail himself of counsel - the proposition deduced from Escobedo and
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Considering whether the right to counsel should be extended to
every step in the proceedings, the court, measuring appellant's
contention against a standard of probability, followed Morris in
holding that all stages do not inherently have such elements as
would necessarily give rise to a probability of prejudice warranting a presumption of prejudice."6
In his second contention, Bonner conceded that perhaps all
stages were not critical, but suggested that the preliminary examination was a critical stage in that the defendant: (a) for
the first time learned the state's case against him; (b) had the
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses before their testimony
became hardened and fixed; and (c) could enter a plea of guilty
to a lesser charge.8 Again without elaboration, the court flatly
rejected this contention.88 Applying the Illinois test for critical
Miranda - was ignored by the Illinois Supreme Court. Justice Schaefer,
in a separate opinion, briefly stated his view of the applicable law. First
observing that this coroner's inquest was non-civil and, therefore, a criminal
or quasi-criminal proceeding in which the criminal defendant was called to
testify and in which substantial rights of the accused were affected, ergo
a critical stage, Justice Schaefer observed that: "[T]he defendant was not
advised of his right to be represented by counsel, and he can not be said
to have waived that right." 39 Ill.2d at 566, 237 N.E.2d at 449.
A very interesting question, but one which is beyond the scope of this
note, is whether the United States Supreme Court will extend the proposition of Escobedo and Miranda to administrative proceedings. In In re
Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957), the Court held that there was a privilege
against self-incrimination in an administrative hearing conducted by a fire
marshall into the cause of a fire where arson was suspected but that there
was no right to counsel. How can the witness intelligently exercise or
waive his privilege without being first afforded an opportunity to avail
himself of counsel?
s6 It is doubtful, even under the federal test, that the critical stage test
applied to affirmative events transpiring at a confrontation between the
state and the accused, would become the basis for a holding that all stages
are critical. It would seem that if the right to counsel were to be extended
to all stages of the prosecution from arrest onward, then such extension
would more rationally be founded upon prejudice to complete investigation
and preparation resulting from delay in appointment of counsel. See text
at notes 59-66 supra.
87 37 Ill.2d at 559, 229 N.E.2d at 531.
In this context, compare the
contentions in Bonner with those of appellant in Harris v. Wilson. See
text at notes 58-59 supra.
88 While the Illinois Supreme Court refused to expressly answer this
contention, the proposition was considered at length in DeToro v. Pepersack,
which was citedby the court in support of its definition of critical stage. It
was held in DeToro that:
Maryland provides alternative methods of gaining the information
sought by [defendant] . . . through cross-examination at the preliminary hearing. The State provides for the deposition of witnesses unable to attend a trial or hearing, for the production and inspection by the
accused of material seized by the State from him or others, and for
furnishing a list of the names and addresses of witnesses to be called
by the State to prove its case in chief. These procedures are no more
restrictive than those afforded the accused in the federal system, and
in some ways more liberal. It appears, therefore, that [defendant]
. . bad
h
other means available whereby he could have obtained that
which he claims he would have preferred to have gained through crossexamination. In view of the existence of these alternatives, we are
constrained to hold that an accused would not be likely to suffer an
actual as distinguished from a theoretical prejudice at his later trial.
332 F.2d 341, 345 (4th Cir. 1964). But see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
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stage, requiring a showing of probability of prejudice, the court
concluded that it could not say that: "[T] he denial of counsel at

this proceeding results in the likelihood of ensuing prejudice
enabling the proceeding to be characterized as a critical stage.""
Despite the fact that Bonner's contentions were consistent with

the trend established by the United States Supreme Court, although this particular question has never been squarely before
it,90 nevertheless, the Illinois Supreme Court has concluded:
"[W]e see no basis for saying that the right to counsel arises
upon preliminary hearing, or that fundamental fairness requires

it.,,91

THE QUESTION OF A STATUTORY GUARANTEE

While Bonner's first theories on appeal were based on the
definition of critical stage and the prejudice resulting from denial of the sixth amendment guarantee to the assistance of counsel at the preliminary examination, his alternative theory was
based on the contention that Illinois' statutory provisions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to counsel at a preliminary
examination.
Section 103-3 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure

provides that:
(a)
Persons who are arrested shall have the right to communicate with an attorney of their choice and a member of their
family by making a reasonable number of telephone calls or in
92
any other reasonable manner.

In addition, section 103-4 of the Code provides:
Any person committed, imprisoned or restrained of his liberty
for any cause whatever and whether or not such person is charged
with an offense shall, except in cases of imminent danger of escape,
(1965), where a key witness testified at the preliminary examination while
the defendant was without counsel. The witness became unavailable at the
time of trial and the prosecution introduced the transcript of his testimony
at the preliminary examination as direct evidence. In reversing the conviction, the Court held that the sixth amendment right "to be confronted
with the witnesses against him" included the right of cross-examination.
Therefore, denial of the right to effective cross-examination of witnesses constitutes a violation of a constitutionally protected right and requires reversal.
89 37 Ill.2d 553, 560, 229 N.E.2d 527, 531 (1967).
90 See authority cited at note 66 supra.
91 37 Ill.2d 553, 557, 229 N.E.2d 527, 530 (1967). This utterance is but
a variation on an earlier theme of the court. The Illinois Supreme Court,
faced with the question of at what point in the proceedings counsel must be
appointed, resolved the question by holding that: "[T]he fact [that] the
legislature has seen fit to now require the matter of counsel to be resolved
at the preliminary examination is not to say that due process requires it."
People v. Bernatowicz, 35 Ill.2d 192, 198, 220 N.E.2d 745, 748 (1966).
The Committee Comments to
92 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §103-3 (1967).
this section state that:
The right of a person in custody to communicate with an attorney is
grounded in the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article II, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §103-3, Committee Comments at 13 (Smith-Hurd
1964).
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be allowed to consult with any licensed attorney at law of this
State whom such person may desire to see or consult, alone and in
private at the place of custody,
as many times and for such period
93
each time as is reasonable.

The above quoted sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure
are directory and carry with them no remedy which is of direct
benefit to the defendant. 9' The redress for violation of the rights
set out in sections 103-3 and 103-4 is an indirect penal action
against an official who deprives an accused of these rights.
The preliminary examination in Illinois is a statutory proceeding.""

Section 109-1 of the Code provides that a person ar-

rested shall be taken before a judge and that:
(b) (2)
The judge shall .. . . [a]dvise the defendant of his right
to counsel and if indigent shall appoint a public defender or
93 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §103-4 (1967).
The Committee Comments to
this section provide that:
This section is not deemed to be in conflict with section 113-3 of the
Code which deals with the problem of counsel for any accused who has
not obtained such by the time he is required to plead to the charge on
arraignment. Section 103-4 says he has a right to consult with counsel
at any time after being taken into custody: Section 113-3 says that
when the time for arraignment arrives he shall be allowed counsel
before pleading for the charge and if he has not obtained counsel by

that time the court shall give him an opportunity to do so ....

Section

113-3 is intended to supplement the basic right afforded by section 103-4.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §103-4, Committee Comments at 15 (Smith-Hurd
F!,1964) (emphasis added).
94 By contrast and analogy, section 103-5 of the Code provides that a
defendant must be tried within 120 days from the date he was taken into
custody (the four-term rule) and carries with it the provision that: "Every
person not tried in accordance with [this. pro'vision] . . . shall be discharged
from custody or released from the obligations of his bail or recognizance."
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §103-5(d) (1967).
It is not apparent why violation of an accused's right to a speedy trial
should result in his discharge from custody and for all practical purposes
have the effect -of an acquittal, while a violation of an accused's right to
counsel should merely result in an action against the peace officer for official
misconduct. Due process requires that an accused be given a speedy trial.
See Klopfer v.- North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) ; People v. Funches, 17
II1.2d. 529, 162 N.E.2d 393 (1959).
It therefore follows that where an
accused is, denied a speedy trial,: due process is, by definition, violated. However, since holding a person in custody, may or may not be justified, the
denial of the right to counsel reduces itself to a probability that due process
is, violated in this regard. Nevertheless, it seems somewhat anomalous that
violation of the one right results in what amounts to acquittal and violation
of the other right results in the mere possibility that the officer will have
misconduct charges pressed against him.
95 Section 103-8 provides:

Any peace officer who intentionally prevents the exercise by an
accused of any right conferred by this Article or who intentionally
fails to perform any act required of him by this Article shall be guilty

of official misconduct ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §103-8 (1967).

The Committee Comments to this
section state that:
Section 103-8 makes mandatory the duty of peace officers in regard to
the basic rights of persons in custody, and requires that a failure to
perform such duties must be done intentionally instead of intentionally
or recklessly as provided in section 33-3 (a) of the Criminal Code of 1961.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §103-8, Committee Comments at 38 (Smith-Hurd
1964).
96 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §109

supra.

(1967).

See authority cited at note 6
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licensed attorney at law of this State to represent him in accordance
with the provisions of Section 113-3 of this Code.97

Section 113-3 of the Code, referred to in section 109-1, states,
in part, that:
(a)
Every person charged with an offense shall be allowed
counsel before pleading to the charge. If the defendant desires
counsel and has been unable to obtain same before arraignment
the court shall recess court or continue the cause for a reasonable
time to permit defendant to obtain counsel and consult with him
before pleading to the charge.
(b)
In all cases, except where the penalty is a fine only,
if the court determines that the defendant is indigent and desires
counsel, the Public Defender shall be appointed as counsel. If
there is no Public Defender in the county or if the defendant requests counsel other than the Public Defender, the court may
appoint as counsel a licensed attorney at law of this State .... 1,

Section 109-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a state-

ment of the formalities of the examination.

Subsection (b)

99

of

109-3 provides that the defendant may waive the preliminary ex-

amination but that the State may nevertheless cause witnesses
to be examined for the purpose of perpetuating testimony. 10

Subsection (c) makes provision for sequestation of witnesses.' 0 '
Thus, section 109-3 makes reference to the taking of evidence,
to the examination of witnesses, and to the defendant's statement or testimony.
Although a preliminary examination is provided for by

statue, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that:
enactment of the statute .

.

"Despite the

. there is no constitutional right to

97 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §109-1(b) (2) (1967).
Interpreted in People v.
Bonner, 37 Ill.2d 553, 560, 229 N.E.2d 527, 531-32 (1967).
98 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §113-3(a)-(b) (1967).
99 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §109-3(b) (1967).
The complete text of this
section is as follows:
If the defendant waives preliminary examination the judge shall
hold him to answer and may, or on the demand of the prosecuting attorney shall, cause the witnesses for the State to be examined. After
hearing the testimony if it appears that there is not probable cause to
believe the defendant guilty of any offense the judge shall discharge
him.
100 The dissenting opinion in People v. Bonner referred to §109-3 (b) and
stated that it:
[E]mphasizes the importance of the preliminary hearing as a means of
perpetuating testimony by its provision that the defendant can not
waive preliminary examination, nor can the judge dispense with it, if
the prosecuting attorney demands that the witnesses for the State be
examined.
37 Ill.2d 553, 567, 229 N.E.2d 527, 535 (1967). For a limitation on such
use, where the right to counsel is not afforded to the accused, compare
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). See discussion at note 50 supra.
101 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §109-3(c) (1967). The complete text of this
section is as follows:
During the examination of any witness or when the defendant is
making a statement or testifying the judge may and on the request of
the defendant or State shall exclude all other witnesses. He may also
cause the witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from communicating with each other until all are examined.
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a preliminary hearing prior to indictment or trial . .. "10'
The defendant in Bonner insisted that his request for counsel at the preliminary examination should have been honored.
In considering the meaning of the aforementioned statutes when
read in conjunction with each other, the defendant read the
provisions of section 103-4 as controlling and suggested that, inasmuch as the statute vested an accused with the right to counsel
from the time of his arrest, this right could be asserted at any

time thereafter.1"'

While admitting that section 109 was silent

as to the right to counsel at the preliminary examination, the
defendant nevertheless contended that inasmuch as the right to
counsel was resolved by section 103-4, any further explanation
of the right to counsel which added nothing to section 103-4
would be redundant. Bonner therefore concluded that section

103-4 had to be read in conjunction with every other statute
dealing with the same subject matter and that the right to counsel at any time after arrest, provided in section 103-4, could be
invoked at any stage in the proceedings. Thus, Bonner distinguished his case from People v. Morris in that he had made a
104
demand for counsel while the defendant in Morris had not.
102 People v. Petruso, 35 Ill.2d 578, 580, 221 N.E.2d 276, 277 (1966);
People v. Bonner, 37 Ill.2d 553, 229 N.E.2d 527 (1967). This question has
most often arisen in a situation where a defendant, having been indicted
by the grand jury, insists that the seemingly nonessential preliminary hearing be held anyway. See, e.g., Bayless v. United States, 381 F.2d 67, 71 (9th
Cir. 1967).
The purpose of the preliminary examination is to determine whether
there is probable cause to hold the accused, see note 9 supra. Therefore,
where probable cause has been established by the return of an indictment,
there would seem to be little if any reason to hold a preliminary examination.
This has moved the court to state that: "[W]e have consistently adhered
to the view that where an indictment is returned containing full information of the crime with which an accused is charged, a preliminary hearing
is not necessary."
People v. Petruso, 35 Ill.2d 578, 580, 221 N.E.2d 276,
277-78 (1966). It does not follow, however, that because there is no right to
a preliminary examination, that there are no rights at a preliminary examination where one is held. A reading of the statute indicates that while
there is no absolute right to a preliminary examination, the accused is
given certain rights thereunder where one is in fact held.
10. In this context the substance of the first two contentions are proximate. In his first contention, Bonner urged that the statutory provision
of section 103-4 assured him of the right to counsel from the time when he
was "committed, imprisoned, or restrained of his liberty for any cause
whatever." In his second contention, Bonner urged that the constitutional
guarantee of the sixth amendment, as applied by the fourteenth amendment,
assured him of the right to counsel from the time he was subject to incustodial interrogation, i.e. from the time when he was "committed, imprisoned,
or restrained of his liberty for any cause whatever." Either proposition
will necessarily result in the conclusion that ati steps in a criminal prosecution are critical.
104 It
must be remembered that the right to counsel under section 103-4
depends upon a demand being made by the accused. Whereas, the state may
be under a legal duty to advise the defendant of his rights, the defendant
must still demand his right to counsel under section 103-4. Bonner made
such a demand at the time when he was at the preliminary examination.
Inasmuch as he was at the preliminary examination at the time of the
demand, the majority of the court refused to look beyond the provisions of
section 109, pertaining to the preliminary hearing. Obviously all of the de-
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The reasoning which underlies and supports the contention that
the right to counsel is guaranteed by statute from the time of
arrest is the same reasoning which supports the contention that
the preliminary examination is a critical stage in the proceedings. It may be generally said that the statutory guarantee is
simply a codification of the federal standard. The comments of
the committee that drafted section 103-3 support this conclusion.15 Thus, although several propositions of law appear to
have been advanced by appellant, in fact Bonner urged but one
point: That an accused has the right to be represented by counsel at a preliminary examination. 10 6 In support of this proposition appellant postulated that the preliminary examination was
a critical stage in the proceedings and that representation at
such a hearing was guaranteed by statute.
The Bonner court, in considering the question of a statutory
guarantee to representation by counsel at the preliminary examination, refused to consider section 103-4 and contented itself
with an examination limited solely to sections 109-1107 and
113-3.10s As admitted by the defendant, these two sections are
silent as to the right to representation at the preliminary examination. The court thus held that sections 109-1 and 113-3:
[M]ust be read in conjunction and when so read it becomes
manifest that the legislature intended that an accused receive
the benefit of appointed counsel only at that stage in the judicial
process when he is to plead to the charge against him.10 9
The majority of the court thus interpreted section 109-1 as
merely directing the judge presiding over the preliminary examination to appoint counsel to represent the accused at the
arraignment"0 and as providing that in the event a preliminary
examination was not held, or where the judge presiding over the
preliminary examination did not so appoint counsel, section 113-3
directed the judge presiding over the arraignment to appoint
counsel before requiring the accused to plead to the charge. The
court therefore concluded that there was no right to counsel
prior to the time that the accused was required to plead to the
fendant's rights at such examination are not specified in the statute pertaining to that hearing.
105 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §103-3, Committee Comments at 13 (SmithHurd 1964). See authority cited at note 59 supra.
106 In this context, it is somewhat curious that the court answered this
proposition by declaring that "an accused does not have a constitutional
right to a preliminary hearing," 37 Ill.2d 553, 559-60, 229 N.E.2d 527, 531
(1967), seemingly falling into the problem discussed in note 102 supra.
107 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §109-1 (1967).
See text at note 97 supra.
108 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §113-3 (1967).
See text at note 98 supra.
109 People v. Bonner, 37 Ill.2d 553, 560, 229 N.E.2d 527, 532 (1967).
110 The court quoted §113-3(a), see text at note 98 supra, laying em]?hasis on the provisions that the accused was to have counsel "before pleading to the charge." People v. Bonner, 37 l.2d 553, 560, 229 N.E.2d 527,
532 (1967). Thus, the determining factor to the majority was whether or
not a plea was required.
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charge against him. Seemingly blind to the existence of section 103-4, the court observed: "[W]here the proceedings are
not of a critical nature and therefore no right to counsel exists
without a showing of actual prejudice, a mere request for counsel does not create the right to it." ' '1

The minority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Schaefer,
pointed out that this question could not be resolved without a
consideration of section 103-4 of the Code. The minority took
the position that the right to counsel at any time after arrest
is established by section 103-4 and that other provisions in the
Code merely supplement the basic guarantee of this section.
Therefore, Justice Schaefer postulated that the various provisions regarding the right to counsel should be construed as being
cumulative and consistent, rather than conflicting. Authority
for this proposition was to be found in the comments of the
committee drafting the Code, which the dissenting opinion
quoted:
'This section (103-4) is not deemed to be in conflict with section
113-3 of the Code which deals with the problem of counsel for any
accused who has not obtained such by the time he is required to
plead to the charge on arraignment.

Section 103-4 says he has

a right to consult with counsel at any time after being taken into
custody: Section 113-3 says that when the time for arraignment
arrives he shall be allowed counsel before pleading to the charge

and if he has not obtained counsel by that time the court shall
give him an opportunity to do so. . . . Section 113-3 is ' intended
to supplement the basic right afforded by section 103-4. 112

In interpreting the provision of section 109-1, requiring
that the judge at the preliminary hearing must advise the accused of his right to counsel and that if the accused is indigent,
must appoint counsel in accordance with the provisions of section 113-3, the minority urged that this reference to section
113-3 merely:
[R]elates to the kinds of cases - felony or misdemeanor - in
which attorneys are to be appointed, to the attorney to be appointed,
- the public defender or other counsel, - and to the fees of
appointed attorneys other than the public defender, both in capital
and non-capital cases ...

113

Therefore, the court held that: "The right to appointed counsel,
if indigent, is restricted by section 113-3 to those cases in which

' 4
the penalty is other than a fine only. 1l

The minority
of the court that
section 109-1 only
nary examination

protested the construction of the majority
the reference to section 113-3 contained in
required the judge presiding at the prelimito appoint counsel at the arraignment, and

11 People v. Bonner, 37 Ill.2d 553, 561, 229 N.E.2d 527, 532 (1967).
112 Id. at 565, 229 N.E.2d at 534.

11Id. at 564-65, 229 N.E.2d at 534.
114 Id. at 565, 229 N.E.2d at 534.
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pointed out that if the majority's construction were correct, section 109-1 would add nothing to section 113-3111 since section
113-3 already provided for counsel at the arraignment. The
dissenting justices concluded that "[tihe right to be represented
by appointed attorney exists at the preliminary hearing; that
right is not, as the majority holds, deferred until the defendant
is arraigned." 116 Further, the limitations found in sections 109-1
and 113-3 are:
[I]ntended to confine the requirement that attorneys be appointed
to represent indigents at preliminary hearings to the class of cases
to be appointed to represent indiin which attorneys are required
11 7
gents upon arraignment.

Justice Schaefer did not feel it necessary to discuss the
question of critical stage. He observed that:
[T]he General Assembly has determined that a defendant is entitled to counsel at his preliminary hearing. It has provided that a
defendant held on any charge is entitled to be represented by counsel at his preliminary hearing, and that 'except where the penalty
is a fine only,' an indigent defendant is entitled to have counsel
appointed to represent him at his preliminary hearing. 11

It was emphasized however that:
[S]ection [109-3] of the Code emphasizes the importance of the
preliminary hearing as a means of perpetuating testimony by its
provision that the defendant can not waive preliminary examination, nor can the judge dispense with it, if the prosecuting attorney demands that the witnesses for the State be examined."1 9
Justice Schaefer, with whom Chief Justice Solfisburg joined in
dissenting, thus impliedly urged that the preliminary hearing in
Illinois was such a critical stage in the proceedings as to require the assistance of counsel.
CONCLUSION
Although a preliminary examination is provided for by
statute, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that "[d]espite the
enactment of the statute there is no constitutional right to a
In
preliminary hearing prior to indictment or trial . . . .",
People v. Bonner, it was not contended that the defendant had
a right, either by constitution or by statute, to a preliminary
115 It was first observed that the Code of Criminal Procedure is explicit
in its recognition of the right to counsel, even prior to the preliminary examination. It was then emphasized that:
The comments of the committee that drafted the Code . . . make
it clear that section 113-3, which governs the right to counsel at arraignment, was intended to supplement rather than to swallow up the provisions of the Code that govern the right to counsel at earlier stages of
the proceedings.
People v. Bonner, 37 Ill.2d 553, 566, 229 N.E.2d 527, 534 (1967).
116 People v. Bonner, 37 Ill.2d 553, 566, 229 N.E.2d 527, 535 (1967).
117 Id. at 566, 229 N.E.2d at 535.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 567, 229 N.E.2d at 535.
120 People v. Petruso, 35 Il.2d 578, 580, 221 N.E.2d 276, 277 (1966).
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Rather, it was contended that inasmuch as a pre-

liminary hearing was held, the defendant's request for assistance
of counsel should have been honored. If no preliminary examination was held there would be no formal examination of witnesses and no presentation of evidence; consequently, there would
be no possibility of resulting prejudice to the accused. However,

when such a hearing is held and the sworn testimony of witnesses is recorded and received, and where evidence may be
presented, the possibility of resulting prejudice arises and the
assistance of counsel is needed for protection of the accused.

The court, in answering Bonner's contention that he had
a right to counsel at the preliminary examination, held that
"an accused does not have a constitutional right to a preliminary
hearing .
-. 121 Though not erroneous per se, this response did
not answer the question of law presented by appellant.

Considering the contention of the appellant that the preliminary examination in Illinois is a critical stage in the proceedings where events transpire which might result in prejudice
to an accused, it would appear that conclusions reached by the
minority had greater support in law and are more consistent
with recent holdings of the United States Supreme Court. In
affording to defendants the right to counsel it is well to recall
the underlying principles as pronounced in Escobedo v. Illinois

that:
We have also learned the companion lesson of history that no
system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to
depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication
through unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system
worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and
exercise, these rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights will
thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then
there is something very wrong with that system.. 22
The requirements of due process would seem to dictate that
an accused be given the same full technical and professional as-

sistance to establish his innocence that the state has within its
command to establish his guilt.

23

By the same token that the

121 People v. Bonner, 37 Ill.2d 553, 559-60, 229 N.E.2d 527, 531 (1967).
122378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
123In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), the Court moved
closer to a position that the accused should have the assistance of counsel
from the time of his arrest. The court of appeals had held that: "[T]he
lineup, held as it was, in the absence of counsel, already chosen to represent

appellant, was a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.

...."

Wade v.

United States, 358 F.2d 557, 560 (5th Cir. 1966). On review, the United
States Supreme Court observed that:
[T]oday's law enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations
of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the
results might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself
to a mere formality. In recognition of these realities of modern crimi-
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right to counsel at the formal trial
when, for all practical purposes, the
sured by pretrial examination,' 12 4 the
is likewise a hollow thing when proof
and conviction is assured by denial of
and lack of access to the full technical
afforded by counsel.

"is a very hollow thing
conviction is already aspresumption of innocence
of innocence is prejudiced
the asssistance of counsel
and professional facilities

To this argument the Illinois Supreme Court has answered
that the defendant must show, by the facts and circumstances
of his case, that failure to appoint counsel resulted in substantial
prejudice, i.e. facts and circumstances which are likely to prejudice the subsequent trial. However, it would seem that the degree of prejudice can never be known. It would therefore follow that the federal test should be applied and that prejudice
should be presumed.
Robert M. Gray

nal prosecution, our cases have construed the Sixth Amendment guaranty to apply to 'critical' stages of the proceedings.
388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967). Thus, United States v. Wade brought forth the
rule that the lineup was a critical stage in the proceedings. Can it be rationally urged that the preliminary examination is any less critical?
124 In
re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 344 (1957) (dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Black).

